DAVIS vs. DAVIS' EXECUTOR.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of .Delaware.
SALLIE B. DAVIS VS. SAMUEL B. DAVIS' EXECUTOR.
1. Proof of the regular execution of a testa-lentary paper establishes a prima facie
case in favor of the party alleging a will.
2. Definition of a will.
3. The competency of parol testimony, in order to ascertain whether a- paper
writing purporting to be a last will, considered, and such testimony admitted.
4. The party propounding the will must show that the document in question was
made as a will, by one capable of making a will, having a knowledge that he was
making a will, and informed of its contents.
5. The executor and trustee, who takes an interest in- a will, cannot be a witness
to sustain it.

This case came up'for trial before Harrington, Chief Justice,
and Judges Wooten and Houston, and a 'special jury. It was an
issue to try "whether the paper writing purporting to be the last
will and testament of Samuel B. Davis, deceased, and 'heretofore
admitted to probate, is or is not the last will and testament of
the said Samuel B. Davis, deceased."
111r. Bates, Mr. George Browne, of Philadelphia, and X,r. Henry
Winter Davis, of Baltimore, for the plaintiff.
Mr. Dallas,of Philadelphia, for the executor.
HARRINGTON, C. J., charged the jury as follows:
On the 5th of July, 1853, Samuel B. Davis, long a resident of
this State, put his signature to a paper writing which he then
stated was his last will and testament, in the forms of law required
as the evidence of so important an act as the testamentary disposal
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of a man's property. The execution of this paper has thus been
proved. It is to be taken to be, the -will of Colonel Davis, if
nothing more appear either to impeach or to support it. It needs'
no further support on: the part of those who set 'itup for a will,
until something is shown to destroy or to impair the credit which it
derives from the fact that it was signed as a w4 and attested as
a will, and published as his will, by the testator himself. This is
what is, meant by prima facie proof, or proof of the factum: a
proof which,-in ordinary eases, imposes upon any party denying
the legal conclusion which is to be drawn from its execution, the
burden of showing that it is'not the will which these formalities
make it seem to,be.
Testamentary power is an important attribute of the right of
property, and a great stimulus to its acquisition, and 'to the
industry and care-taking necessary to its acquisition. The absolute
right, therefore, of disposing of it according to the will and
pleasure of. the pbssessor, is to be recognized as a principle of
justice, and of sound policy. It has not been denied or restricted
in the argument of this case; but it is conceded that Colonel Davis
had the right to dispose of the large estate which he possessed,
according to his will and pleasure. It f11 be for you to decide
whether he has done so.
I The paper which I hold in my hand is proposed to you as the
evidence of the will qf -Colonel Davis. It is opposed and objected
to by the widow and children, who deny that it contains the evidence of his testamentary purposes, and who. affirm that it never
was his will. The Register, to whom it was offered for probate,
has seen proper to take the advice of a jury on this question ; and
has ient to 'us for trial the issue, which you have been qualified to
answer, "whether the paper writing purporting to be the last
will and testament of Samuel B. Davis, deceased, and heretofore
admitted to probate, is or is not the last will and testament of the
said Samuel B. Davis, deceased ?"
This, gentlemen, is a question of' fact. It is so purely a question of fact, that formerly it was not the practice for the Court to
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charge the jury upon the tiila offsuch iissues, supposing, that its
duty was discharged -by merely prIning at the -trial, regulatingthe procee4ings, and deciding questions nf evidence that might
leen, for the Court to add
arise: Of late'years the praciice =ihs
a brief charge to the jury, with aiewtofUirect attention to proper
points for their consideration. 'Wm )have been asked to do so on,
this occasion; and certain niatters lhave been presented to us as
legal propositions, upon wliidh woe t'asked to charge you; but,
after al, gentlemen, -ihat lawcanthere be applicable to the solution of a mere question of ffa#, 4iidh Jis. not the- law or common
sense, belonging no less to (offiers flan to the judicial mind, and
very fully shared by the intelligentjurwhose duty it is to decide.
this case.
A will; what is it? and hiow is it to'belkown? Does it rest in
the speech by which it is manifested, or the paper through whichit is supposed to be communicated, or the act by which it is
apparently indicated ? All these are but mediums through which
the purpose of the testator is to be understood by others; the will
rests in his intention and puripose, the knowledge of which, though
we may not in the nature .of things ever reach it with demonstrative certainty, we satisfactorily attain to, just in proportioni to
the safety and reliability of the medium througi which it is sought.
This is a common sense remark, apjreciable by you as fully as by
any one, and yet it contains ithe foundation and substance of nll
the law on this subject. Does a man, in the full possession of his
faculties, indicate by word, or
.writing,
or gesture, that it is his
intehtion a certain person shall1have his property upon his decease,
that is his will; even though ihe ypolicy of the law may not allow it
thus to be proved; and a man 'who, from any defect, mental or
physical, or from mistake or decepfion, should in all the forms of
law dispose -of his property as he ,dia mot in truth mean to dispose
of it, would not thereby 6xpress is ifnteittion, and the instrument
would not be his 'zwl.
The force and value of the 'actiaonas inuicative of the intention,
must depend on all the circumstances -Burrounding it. If a
,
capable of reading a paper, executes iftfiih due formality'
is a
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reasonable inference that he knows its contents, and that it contains
his intentions. - Sq strong is this inference in case of the execution
of deeds and other instruments, that it becomes a legal concltsion
which, -under ordinary circumstances, the party is'not permitted to
deny; and this has, according to some of the cases which you have
heard cited, been applied even to wills. You heard the question
argued on an objection which was made to our admitting parol
declarations of the testator to contradict the conclusion thus drawn
from the'act of executing the paper, an argument which was based
on the legal as well as the reasonable inference from that act; but
we considered, as it has heretofore been adjudged by our courts,
that there is no such legal conchusiveness to be given to the formal
act of executing a paper for a will as to preclude proof arising from
the declarations and acts of the testator, before; at the time, or
after, and all the surrounding circumstances, that the paper is not
his will. Generally, the animus teitandiis the natural and primary
inference from the.act of signing and formal publication; but this
inference may be weakened or destroyed by any attending circumstances of sufficient force, by evidence of the weakness or incapacity
of the testator to do, or of the want of intention actually to do, what
he seems to do by that act. This is not admitting parol evidence to
vary the will, but to ascertain whether it is really the will of the
decedent.
We, therefore, throw the case open upon the evidence, not only
in 'conformity with former practice, but as required by our judgment
of the. law, now again confirmed upon full and forcible argument.
Proof, therefore,: satisfactorily made, of instructions 'given by the
deceased, of his declarations respecting his intentions, of his known
affections or dislikes, of the position and quality of his estate, of
previous testamentary intentions; of instructions or actual dispositions ;.of his own condition in reference to health or disease,.of body
or of mind; his physical infirmities, especially of the organs called
into action in making or understanding a will-all these are in our
judgment proper subjects of consideration on the important question,
whether the paper does or not contain the real testamentary intentions and wishes of the party who signs it. Take them all, gentlemen,
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and review the testimony on these'and all other matters bearing bn
this question; I need not, and I will not particularize them; I might omit something in your view important, or present something differing
in some respect from your views of the evidence of it; th6y are all
yours, their force as well a their existence, and you must decide
upon them. The whole evidence has be6n laid bWfore you with great
propriety, both of 'question and answer, studiously avoiding everything immaterial, and plainly presenting everything that might tend
to elucidate the grieat question whether Col. Davis made this paper
with a knowledge of its contents, and whether it expresses his testamentary purposes.
I shall mention only such facts as are necessary to notice the
legal positions to be mentioned;' and always subject to your correction.* Col. Davis attained an advanced age; he was seveial
years over eighty when this paper was signed; he was more or less
blind; more or less deaf; the former from disease, relieved partially
at one time by an operation; the latter from the ordiniry consequence of advancing age, and the extent of which we specially
submit to your decision; but as to his mental capacity.it has not
been questioned but that he was competent to make a'will. He
made a will prior to 1845, a portion of the contents of Wihich has
been proved by Mr. Huffington; he made a will in 1850, which is
in evidence; and he executed this paper as his will in 1853. Is
that his will?
In conducting your examination through the facts to a solution
of this question, there are some rules of law that may aid you. One
is the onus probandi. We have remarked upon this before. The
party who alleges the will, must prove that it was made as a will and
with a will, by a party capable of doing the act, having the knowledge
that he was doing it, and having knowledge of the contents of the
paper which professes to be the evidence of his testamentary.purpose.
It is not essential to be proved in any case that the will was actually.
read over by or to the testator, if there be other evidence sufficient
to satisfy the Jury that he was made acquainted with its contents.
A blind man may make a will; a valid will maybe diwn by a party
taking an interest under it; but the blindness of the testator, or
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the interest of the party-drawing and' attending to the'execution of
'the instrument, are circumstances tending'to put the jury on their
guard in scrutinizing the evidence which is offered to show knowledge
of its conten ts. In Earrisonvs. Brown, 3 Wash. C. C. Rep. 584,
the proposition was submitted that it was necessary to prove the
reading over of the will; but Judge Washington said it was not
necessary, in order to establish a will, that the person qlaiming
under it should prove that it was read over to the testator in the
presence of the attesting, or of other witnesses. The law presumes,
in general, that the will was read by or to .the testator. "But if
evidence be given that the testator was blind, or from any cause
incapable of readiny,; or if a reasonable, ground is laid for believing
that it was not read. to him, or that there was fraud or imposition
of any kind practiced upon the testator, it is incumbent on those
who would support the will, to meet such proof by evidence, and to
satisfy the Jury, either that the will-was read, or that the contents
were known by the. testator." See Eng. Ecc. Rep. 870 ; Fincam vs. Edwards, 8 Curtis, 68 ; Ingram vs. Wyatt, 1 ibid,
442; Bartonvs. Bobbins, 8 Phillim. 455, and 1 W'ms Ex'rs, 16, 293.
In Barry vs. Butler, 6 Eng. Ece. Rep. 418, 9, it is said, "the
,strict meaning of this term ' onus jrobandi" is this, that if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burden is cast, the issue
must be found against him. In all cases, this onus is imposed on the
party propounding a will; it is in general discharged by proof of
capacity and the faict of execution; from which the knowledge of
and assent to the contents of the instrument are assumed, and it
cannot be that the simple fact of the party who prepared the will,
being himself a legatee,-is in every case and under all circumstances,
to create a contrary presumption, and to call upon the Court to pronounce against the will, unless additional evidence is produced to
provd the knowledge of its contents by the deceased. ":All that
can be truly said is, that-if a person, whether attorney or not, prepares a will with a legacy to himself, it is at most a suspicious
circumstance of more or less weight, according to the facts of each:
particular case-; in some of no weight at all, as in: the case of a
tricing bequest out of a large estate, but varying according to
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circumstances; for instance, the quantum of the legacy, and the
proportion it bears to the property diposed of, and numerous other
contingencies; but in no case amounting to more than a circumstance of suspicion, demanding the vigilant care and circumspection
of the Court in investigating the case, and calling upon it not to
grant probate without full and entire satisfaction that the instrument did express the real intentions of the deceased. Nor can it
be necessary that in all such case8, even if the testator's capacity
is doubtful, the precise species of evidence of the deceased's knowledge of the will is to be in the shape of instructions for, or reading
over the instrument. They form, no doubt, the most satisfactory,
but they are not the only satisfactory description of proof by which
the cognizance of the contents of the will may be brought home to
the deceased. The Court would naturally look for such evidence;
in some cases it might be impossible to establish a will without it,
but it has no right in every case to require it."
These quotations apply in principle to the case before you, and
you must apply the facts of the case to them. Col. Davis was niore
or less blind; the draftsman of the will, though not by name a
legatee, took an interest under it as executor and trustee, the extent
and force of which the jury must judge of in estimating the amount
of suspicion that this circumstance throws over the case, and the
corresponding necessity it produces of evidence to be required, in
addition to the act of formal execution, to satisfy the jury that Col.
Davis had a knowledge of the contents of the will.
The interest is such that we were obliged, under our view of the
law of evidence, to exclude the executor and trustee from giving
testimony in the cause ; but we remark, also, that it is not the naked
interest of a gratuitous legatee, but an interest with an obligation
of service. We leave its force in this connection, to your jttdgment; and as to the relation of attorney and client existing between
the draftsman and the supposed testator, it is not an absolutelydisqualifying relation, but it is to be considered solely with reference
to its bearing upon the question what amount of evidence of knowledge of contents the jury will require to be satisfactorily proved in
order to establish the paper as a will. In most cases, an attorney
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drawing a client's will, would not be a circumstance of remark, 6ven
where he took an interest under it, as Where proof of capacity and
of the factum are both complete ; ii others, where capacity or knowledge of contents is the point -of consideration, the circumstance
may attract more or less attention from the parties and the attending circumstances. As a general principle, the law does not imply
a controlling influence of a lawyer over his client.
The contestants ask us to charge that if the proof establishes
either inability of the testator fr6m blindness to read the will for
himself, or that an interest is shown in the draftsman of the will
and person managing its execution, the will fails, unless there be
proof affirmative, beyond the act of execution, that it was read to
the testator, or a knowledge of its contents otherwise communicated
to him. We have answered this proposition affirmatively, in the
quotations before made, and to which I have asked the jury to apply
the facts in evidence.
But if that state of things is made out, it is alleged on the part
of the executor that knowledge of the contents of this will, and
proof of intention, are made out by the correspondence of its contents with previous wills made by Col. Davis. By the instructions
given to Mr. Rogers to draw the will, by the circumstances attending its execution, other than the mere fact of signing and publication, which they say afford proof of actual reading, or at least the
probability of it, in the absence of the testimony of the only person
who knows the truth of that matter, but who cannot, by reason of
his relations to the will, be heard. To this the contestants answer,
denying the correspondence of this with previous wills; denying
the instructions or suggesting that the proof of the instructions is
weaker than that of the paper they are invoked to support; that
there are many discrepancies between the supposed instructions and
the instrument on trial sufficient in themselves, if not shown to have
been explained to the testator, to render the will void, and that in
respect to any evidence of actual knowledge of the dispositions contained in this paper, it has been met by proof of declarations made
by the testator, that it contained other and different dispositions.
Gentlemen, we do not think it proper to enter upon anything like
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an application of the evidence to these several propositions; the
case has been fully and ably argued on them all, and that argument
must be fresh in your recollection. We only call your attention to
the tQpics, and leave the consideration of them to you. -As to instructions, if they are satisfactorily proved to have emanated from
the testator, with knowledge of their contents, they are evidence of
great force in support of a will drawn in pursuance of them ; and
being generally but heads or suggestions, the proper amplification
of them in the more formal instrument is tight and proper; but as
to essential variations this court said in Chandler vs. Ferris, 1
Harr. 464, that if the jury were of opinion that these differences
existed to such an extent as to make the will essentially different
from the instructions, they must then judge from the evidence
whether these deviations were made with the knowledge and consent .of the testator. If they were not made known to him, if the
will was not read over, or its contents and variations from the in-'
structions otherwise explained to him, then it would not be his will,
but if he knew of and approved the alterations, he adopted them
by the execution of the will, and the same ought to be confirmed.
The same remark may be made, generally, of all declarations made
by the testator, in reference to what was to be, or what had been inserted in his will. We have admitted such declarations in evidence as
bearing on the question whether Colonel Davis knew of the contents
of this paper and approved of them, as to which, if there be satisfactory evidence derived from other sources that he had such knowledge, these declarations would not be allowed to controvert the
more solemn expression of intention in the will itself. But, in the
absence of such other evidence of knowledge of its contents, and
considered solely with a view to the question whether the paper was
ever read or explained to him, declarations satisfactorily proved to
have been deliberately made by him in good faith and credited by the
jury, of testamentary bequests altogether different from the bequests
of the will would be evidence to disprove his knowledge of its actual contents. Thus we have been specially asked to charge you,
that if you believe from the evidence that Col. Davis actually
thought the Fourth street property was devised to his daughter Har-
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tiet, or that Delamore Place was devised, to his son Delaware )avis

in this will, and they are not so devised, this would be evidence that
the contents of this paper were' never made known to him so that
he understood it, and the paper- could not therefore be established
as his will. The two things are inconsistent, and therefore could
not exist together. A person having testamentary capacity,
could not believe he had devised important portions of his estate
one way, while he had disposed of them another, on the same. day
of the execution of his will, if he knew of the contents of the will.
At the same tinie the declaration of such belief is open to any remark' tending to impeach its force, and subject as all other testimony is, to be weighed by the jury. - ,
We suppose that we have now discharged ourselves of the burden
of this cause so far as it rested on the Court. In its progress'we
have been called on to decide several questions of great general importance, and of particular consequence, perhaps, in the case itself,
but none of them were new to the practice or consideration of the
Court, though they were examined on this occasion with more
thoroughness of research and argument than before. The result was
announced at the time; and, though on one of the points there is a
conflict of opinion among judges of high 'character, we bad not and
have not, any hesitation in adhering to the long continued and often
repeated decisions of the Courts of this State. If the decision on
the other point, ruling out the testimony of the only person, besides
the attesting witnesses, who were present at the execution of the paper now under trial, shall be regarded as bearing hardly on the case,
it is the consequence of an important rule of evidence which may
not be violated without infinitely more of mischief than could happen by adhering to it in any case.
The case which is now committed to you is doubtless one of much
importance in its 'general and particular bearings; but we commit
it to you with entire confidence that you will, decide it with intelligence and a conscientious regard to duty.
VERDICT.-The jury retired to their room at half-past 11 o'ciock,

and returned into Court at thirty-five minutes after I o'clock, P. M.
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Upon being asked in the usual form, if they had agreed upon
their verdict, they replied that they had. Whereupon, the foreman
said, they found that the paper writitlg, purporting to be the last
will and testament of Samuel B. Davis, was not the last will and
testament of Samuel B. Davis.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia.
THOMPSON VS. ALEXANDER.'
HIRING SLAVES.
1. A master cannot absolve himself from the legal and equitable obligation to take
care of his slave; and if he refuse to do so, he is liable for medical and other
relief furnished by others.
2. If a slave be hired to an insolvent, or be out of the possession of the hirer, and
be placed in a situation to require instant and indispensable medical aid or other
assistance; in such a case the owner, as well as the hirer, would probably be
liable for necessary medical and other services.
3. The hirer of the slave, and not the general owner, is liable in an action for medicine and medical services rendered the slave while the term of hiring continuedthe services and medicine not being rendered at the request of the owner, but at
the request of the hirer.
4. A particular custom in a county, that the general owner shall pay the expenses,
does not supersede or control the legal principle.
5. The hirer of a negro is not entitled to an abatement from the price on account of
the sickness of the negro, unless the sickness originated in causes existing at the
time of hiring, and which were unknown to the hirer.
6. The hirer of a slave is bound to use ordinary diligence, in regard to the health of
the slave; that is, such diligence as a prudent man commonly takes of his own
slave; and this ordinary diligence is to be employed, not only in protecting the
slave from danger and disease, but likewise in discovering the dlsease'if it exists,
and in its treatment also.
7. If the hirer o? a slave fail to perform his duty in supplying the slave with medical and other necessary assistance, the owner may do it, and look to the hirer for
reimbursement.
' Reported in 14 Georgia Supreme Court Reports, 259, just published.
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8. Under special circumstances, the hirer, although preliminarily liable to tho physician, might, nevertheless, be entitled to relief, a between the owner and himself, especially in a Court of Equity.
9. If a slave hired for general and common service, be employed at any hazardous
business, without the consent of the owner, and death, or any other damage ensue,
the hirer would make himself liable for the injury.
10. Notwithstanding the hirer be answerable, in the absence of any agreement to
the contrary, for expenses attendant on the sickness of a slave, it is competent
to protect himself by contract.

Assumpsit, in De Kalb Superior Court.
April Term, 1853.

Decided by Judge Hill,

The facts of this case were as follows:
The plaintiff in error had hired a negro man to Joseph Thompison,
in the city of Atlanta, for a year. During that period, and while
the negro was in the possession of Thompson, he was attacked with
smallpox. Thompson immediately called in Dr. Alexander, the
defendant in error, as a physician to attend the negro, without previously notifying his owner that he was sick.
Dr. Alexander attended on the negro; and on the refusal of the
owner to pay.his bill for so doing, brought this action to recover
the amount.
No contract was shown between the owner and the hirer, as to who
was to pay for medical services, in case of sickness; but the testimony of several physicians was offered and admitted, to the efect,
that it was their practice to charge the owner in such cases. A
physician was perm*itted to testify his opinion, that the smallpox
was a dangerous disease; though he had never seen a case of it.
To the above stated testimony defendant objected; and excepts to
its admission by the Court. It appeared in testimony, also, that
the owner of the slave resided in the country, six or eight miles from
Atlanta; that a great deal of alarm existed on account of the smallpox, while it prevailed in Atlanta; and that intercourse between
the town and country was very much obstructed. by that alarm,
though no legal obstacle was interposed.
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This testimony was offered as a reason why the owner had not
been notified of the negro's sickness.
The testimony being closed, the Court charged the jury, that if
the slave was in such a condition that there was not time to notify
the owner, without probable injury to the slave, that the hirer might
call in a physician; and the physician could collect his bill out of
either the owner or hirer, without notice to the owner.
The jury found for plaintiff; and the defendant excepted to the
said rulings and charges of the Court.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LumpKIN, J.-1. It is conceded that circumstances might exist,
which would fix a responsibility upon the owner, not only without
his consent, but even against his dissent. We believe the case of
.lairchild vs. Bell, 2 Brevard, 129, to be of this description.
There the owner of a female slave had cruelly beaten her, and had
driven her away from his house and plantation, and exposed her to
perish for want of food and from the pains of her bruises; and a
neighboring physician, from motives of humanity, took the slave
under his protection, and afforded her medical and other relief. It
was adjudged, and we think very properly, that the action of
assumpsit might be maintained, to recover from the owner a recompense for medicine and attendance, and for the sustenance of the
wench during her illness, notwithstanding the defendant had
forbidden him to receive the slave, or to give her any assistance.
The Court considered, as every enlightened tribune would do,
that the master was bound, by the most solemn obligation, to protect and preserve the life of his slave; that he could no more divest
himself of this obligation than could the husband and father the
duty of supporting and maintaining a wife or child; that the slave
lives for his master's service alone-his time, his labor, his comforts,
are all at his disposal; and that consequently, the duty of humane
treatment and medical assistance, when clearly necessary, ought not
and cannot be withholden by the owner; and that if he cruelly and
35
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capriciously attempts to do so, the aid and comfort denied by him,
may be rendered by another at his expense; that in such a case,
the master being under a legal ond equitable obligation, a contract
and liability will be implied, from the reason, justice and necessity
of the case.
But this is a case where no other person is substituted for, and
made to stand for the time being, in the quasi relation of master to
the slave.
2. But I will go further. In my opinion, the bare fact that the
negro had been hired to another, does not necessarily, and under all
circumstances, absolve the owner from the duty which he owes, both
to the slave and to the community, to afford him protection, and
provide for his wants in sickness and in old age. Suppose the hirer
is insolvent, or permit the slave to absent himself from him, and his
life is in imminent danger, from disease; or any other cause? In a
oae so circumstanced, Ishould not hesitate to hold the master bound
to make compensation to the physician, victualler, clothier, or any
other good Samaritan, who would interpose, through humanity, to
administer to the wants of the suffering slave.
3. But the cases supposed are not the one before us. It is not
pretended biut that the hirer, Dr. Thompson, is abundantly able to
pay. The negro was in his possession. Nor was the emergency so
sudden and pressing as to take the case out of the rule, which will
not allow one man to make another his debtor against his will; and
which holds that if one sees my fence out of repair, and he planks
it up, to protect my property from depredation, that he can neither
charge me with the expense, nor afterwards even take away the
plank which he has nailed to my posts.
The only question in this case, then, is whether Dr. Alexander
is to look to Dr. Thompson, who employed him, for his bill, or is at
liberty to charge Mr. Latimer, who did not employ him, nor have
any knowledge of the sickness of the slave, or of the plaintiff's
attendance, although he resided within six or eight miles of Atlanta
at the same time.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Haywood vs. Long,
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Iredell, 438, have answered this identical inquiry. They-say,
" We think very clearly the former, (Dr. Thompson.) If, indeed,
the slave had not been hiied out, the owner would not be liable .for
the physician's bill, unless there was a request of the owner, or subsequent promise to pay. At least, that must be the general rule;
though it may be liable to an exception, that where it is a case of
life and death, or there is a pressing necessity for immediate assistance, the master would be liable for the attendance that 'was indispensable before there was a reasonable time or opportunity for
notice to the master.
But unless in case of that kind-if even in that-the services of
the physician, without the request of the owner, and at the instance
of the slave or any one else, must be deemed gratuitous in-respect
to the master."
The Court notice the decision of Lord Kenyon, at Nisi Prius, in.
Searman vs. Castell, 1 Esp. Rep. 270, where it was* held, that the
master was liable for medicine for his servant, while in his service, on the same ground that he was bound to provide food and
lodging for him; and then proceed:
"But surely, if liable at all, he ought not to be until notice of
the necessity, and his refusal to neglect to provide attendance and
medicines." But the very reasons given in that case, says Judge
Ruffin, "show that tk?8 plaintiff cannot recover ; for the liability
is confined to the case in which the servant is under the master's'
roof, as a part of his family, and put upon the same footing as that
for necessary food; thus placing the liability in this ease, upon the
person who was in posse8ion of the slave-who was also the em-

ployer of the plaintiff."
"In this Court there has been no case of this kind before; for
we believe it has never been suggested hitherto, that the revisioner,
if he may so be called, merely as such was liable for medical services for the slave, more than for his food, while hired out, where
they had been rendered, not at his request, but at that of his possessor."
The case of Jones vs. Allen,'5 Ired. 473, was the same as that of
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Baywood vs. Long, except that the plaintiff offered to prove, 'as he
attempted to do in the ease under consideration, that in the section of
the country where the hiring to6k place, it was the ciistom for the
owner, and not the hirer, to pay for the medical attendance on a
slave. The Court again held, that there was no doubt of the liability of the temporary owner of hired slaves for the expense of
their maintenance and medicine during sickness; and that the
general law upon that point must operate, and could not be controlled by any understanding to the contrary in particular- neighborhoods: that there was no established general custom on the
point; for if there was, that would in truth be the law. But that
a mere local usage, in a small part of the country, cannot change
the law, and give the plaintiffs an action against one man, when
they were employed by another.
.; This question has been made'and determined in the Courts of
South Carolina. In the case of Wells vs. Kennedy, 4 McCord's
Rep. 182, the Court of Appeals of that State held, that the general
owner was not liable for the doctor's bill, either by the rules of law
or the policy of the country; for that the hirer had no more right
to throw the expenses of the negro's sickness upon the general
owner, than to an abatement of the hire during the period of'sickness.
As early as 1823, it was decided in our sister State of Alabama,
that the hirer of a slave is bound to pay the physician for his services;
aid that the owner was not liable, unless he had requested services
of the physician. Meeker vs. Clildress, Minor's Rep. 109.
And this decision, made at this early history of the Supreme
Court of that State, being the first year of its organization, has
been acquiesced in and considered as law since that time, See
ibson vs. Andrews, 4 Ala. Rep. 766.
* Cases from other slave States might be cited. I am content with
those which have been adduced, coming, as they do, from 'our
nearest neighbors 4n both sides, and States whose social condition.
is so similar, in all respects, with our own.
4. That a contrary understanding prevails in some portions of
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our State, we know to be true; and ona that has originated entirely
in considerations of policy. It has been supposed that slaves that
are hired are more likely to be neglected, if the temporary owner
is made liable for physicians' bills. But we apprehend that the
whole law regulating this contract, is properly understood, that no
such consequences will follow.
5. It is now settled in this State, that one to whom a slave is
hired for a year, is entitled to no abatement of the price because of
the death of the slave, after the commencement of the term. This,
of itself, will constitute a strong motive for taking care of the slave;
for the hirer, seeing that he is bound to pay for the negro for the
time stipulated, living or dead.
Then again, it has never been supposedI think, that the hirer
is entitled to a discount for the loss of the service of the negro
hired, on account of sickness, unless it originated in causes existing
at the time of the hiring, and which were unknown to the hirer.
For all purposes, the law.looks upon this contract as quasi, a
sale pro tempore. All the owner undertakes is, that the negro is
sound at the time; and the hirer takes the' chance of his remaining go. And here, again, is a direct appeal to the interest of the
hirer, to take care of the slave, that he may be able to perform the
service for which he was employed.
6. But besides this, and what, perhaps, is not so well understood, the hirer of a slave is bound to use ordinary diligence in
regard to the health of the slave; that is, such diligence as. a
prudent man commonly takes of his own slave, placed in like circumstances. He must not only use ordinary diligence in protecting
the slave from danger and disease, but ordinary diligence in discovering disease if it exists ; and ordinary diligence in its treatment.
7. And failing to perform his duty in this particular, the hirer
will not only make himself personally responsible tb the owner for
what injury results from his neglect, but the owner himself would
have the right to supply the necessary medical aid and look to the
hirer for remuneration. In addition to all this, the owner may still

, THOMPSON

vs. ALEXANDER

furnjsh any supplementary aosistance -which he may see it. Fixing
the legal liability upon the hirer, does not preclude him from indulging to any extent his wishes in this respect. And so far from
rejecting his proposed aid, the hirer will be gratified, no doubt, to
have all his diseases speedily healed.
Whether this case, then, is to be determined by the principles of
law or the policy of the Courts, we are well satisfied that this action
cannot be maintained. There is no privity of contract between Dr.
Alexander and Mr. Latimer. So far as Mr. Latimer was concerned,
the services rendered the slave were wholly gratuitous.
And could any case arise, which would better' enforce the rightfulness of this doctrine than the present ? This slave was bid off
by Dr. Thompson at the beginning of the year, at public outcry, at
$91. He is employed as a waiter in the hotel of Dr. Thompson, at
Atlanta. A guest is attacked with smallpox, and the boy is put to
wait on him, and contracts the disease,; for the treatment of which
an account is raised, reasonable enough, I have no doubt, against
Mr. Latimer, as the guardian of an orphan, of $100 IMr. Latimer had, by the contract of hiring, lost all control over the slave.
He had no right to remove him from exp6sure to the epidemic, or
to prevent him from being placed in contact with it. And yet,
when the negro is attacked, without being notified of his situation,
living as he did in the vicinity of the place, a physician is called in,
and he is made chargeable for a bill exceeding by nine dollars the
whole year's hire! Well might the Court say in this case, in 4
McCord, "There is no forseeing the consequences that might result
to the owners of slaves, if they were made liable for services rendered under such circumstances."
8. We have not decided, nor do we intend to say,that under certain circumstances the hirer might not have relief against the
owner,'especially in a Court of Equity, for medical services rendered the slave Suppose, for instance, that a disease should exist
and develope itself during the term, which might not materially incapacitate the slave from labor during the period for which he was
hired, and yet one which, from its character, would not admit of
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delay or postponeihent in its treatment until the end of the term.
In such casa, it would be manifestly unjust that the whole expense,
or even perhaps the greater part,,should fall on the temporary
owner. He should be entitled to apportionment.
So in the present instance,, if the negro contracted a dangerous
disease, without fault on the part of the hirer,and the case required
instant indispensable assistance, the entire loss should not fall pn
the hirer, perhaps. And although primarily liable to the physician,
he might go into Chancery and obtain redress, as against the owner,
if remediless at law.
9. Upon that point, however, we express no opinion. For the
law, I know, will not permit a slave, hired as this was, for general
and common service, to be employed in any hazardous business,
without the consent of the owner. And if death Were to ensue
from such employment, the hirer would make himself liable for the.
value of the slave.
10. Of course it may be made the subject of coniract, whether
the expenses attendant on the sickness of a slave be borne by the
master or the person who hires him. But in the absence of any
such agreement, we are clear that it is not only in conformity with
the abstract principles of law, but of sound policy also, to hold the
hirer answerable. Not only is the absolute control of the slave
surrendered by tle master for the time being, but the obligation to
supply his daily and hourly wants, would seem necessarily, and in
the natural course of things, to be devolved upon the other person,
who assumes the absolute possession of the slave..
Our unanimous opinion, therefore, is, that the judgment be reversed.

. STATE vs. PATTON.

*&Ae Spremne

ourt of Lou.4iani,

Apri4 1855.

, STATE vs. -TAMES PATON, APPELLANT.'
On a trial for murder, the prisoner's counsel were about calling witnesses to prove
his iusnity, when he interposed, refused to permit that defence to be set up,
discharged his counsel and submitted his case to thi jury without evidence.
Thq counsel remonstiated and offered to establish his insanity by irresistible
i~r
but'the CouRi overruled their objection, and refused to hear them further
4 14i d fence. Hehl, to be erro, and that the evidence ahould have been per-

wittad togo to thejury.

Appeal fro r the First District Court, New Orleans.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SPAPPORD J.-Upon the trial of James Patton for the murder of
Walter - irnbull, the following bill of dxceptions was, taken by the
pr'oner's counsel:
-Be it remembered, that on the trial'of this cause, on the 20th
day of-Match1854,'after the evidence on the part Qf the Stati was
closed, and when the counsel of the prisoner were proceeding to
prove by the evidence of -witnesses, the insanity of the said prisoners
a- the time ot th e killing set forth in the indictment; and a long
time before, and ever since the said killing; the said prisoner aiose
and objected to and repudiated the said defence, and insisted upon
discharging his counsel, and submitted his case to the jury without
any further evidence or action of his counsel in his defence; his'
counsel opposed and remonstrated against the prisoner's .being permitred to do so, alleging that they were prepared to prove the defence by clear'and irresistible testimony; but the court overruled
the objection of the said counsel, and permitted the prisoner to discharge his counsel;-and-refused to hear them further in his defence,
and gave the case to the jury without any further evidence or pleading on his behalf; to all which opinion and ruling of said court the
defendant's said counsel excepts, and prays his exceptions may be
signed, &c.
(Signed)' JoiiN B. ROBERTSON, Judge.
Monday, April 19th, 1855, before Thomas Slidell, 'Chief Justice; Cornelius
Voorhies, A. M. Buchanan, A. N. Ogden, and H. M. Spafford, Associate Justices.
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There was a verdict of -" guilty without capital punishment "and, after the former counsel had in the quality of amici curice
attempted to obtain a new trial and arrest of judgment without
success, the prisoner was sentenced to hard labor for life in the
penitentiary.
From this judgment the present appeal has bten taken:The sanity or insanity of the prisoner is a matter of fact; the
admissibility of evidence to establish his insanity, under the bircumstances detailed in the bill of exceptions, is a matter of law, and
the only matter which the constitution authorizes this tribunal-to
decide.
The case is so extraordinary in its circumstances that we are left
without the aid of precedents.
In support of the ruling of the district judge, it has been urged
that every man is presumed to be sane until the contrary appears,
and that a person on trial for an alleged offence has a constitutional
right to discharge his counsel at any moment, to repudiate their
action on the spot, and to be heard by himself; hence the inference
is deduced that the judge could not have admitted the evidence,
against the protest of the prisoner, without reversing the ordinary
presumption, and presuming insanity.
In criminal trials, it is important to keep ever in mind the distinction between law and fjct, between the functions of a judge and
those of a jury.
It was for the jury, and the jury alone, to determine whether
there was insanity or not, after hearing the evidence and the instructions of the Court as to the principles of law applicable to the case.
By receiving the proffered evidence for what it might be worth,
the judge would have decided no question of fact: he would merely
have told the jury," the law permits you to hear and weigh this evidence; whether it proves anything, it is for you to say."
By rejecting it, he deprived the jury of some of the means of
arriving at an enlightened conclusion upon a vital point peculiarly
within their province, and, in effect decided himself, and without
the aid of all the evidence within his reach, that the prisoner was
sane.
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It is idle to say that the legal presumption, and the prison'er's
own declarations, appearance and conduct on the trial, established
his sanity to the satisfaction of both judge and jury ;-for presumption may be overthrown, declarations may be unibunded, and conduct and appearances may be deceitful; and the prisoner's counsel,
sworn officers of thecourt, with their professional character at stake
,upon the loyalty of their conduct, alleged that they stood there
prepared to prove by what they deemed clear and irresistible testimon'y, that the accused was insane at the time of the homicide, long
before, and ever since; so that the sole inquiry now is, not whether
they or the Court were right as to the fact of sanity upon which
we can have no opinion, but, whether they should have been allowedto put the testimony they had at hand before the jury, to be weighed
with the counter evidence.
If the prisoner was insane at the time of the trial, as counsel
offered to prove, he was incompetent to conduct his own defence
unaided, to discharge his counsel, or to waive a right.
Upon the supposition that the counsel were mistaken in regard
to the weight of the evidence they wished to offer, as they may have
been, still its introduction could do the prisoner no harm, nor could
it estop him from any other defence he might choose to make on his
own account; neither could it prejudice the State, for it is to be
presumed that the jury would have given the testimony its proper
weight; if, on the other hand, the counsel were not mistaken as to
the legal effect of this evidence, the consequences of its rejection
would be deplorable indeed.
The overruling necessity of the case seems to demand that, whenever a previous soundness of mind and consequent accountability
for his acts are in question, the rule that he may confrol or discharge
his counsel, atpleasure, should be so far relaxed as to permit then!
to offer'evidence on those points, even against his will. Considering
therefore, that it would be more in accordance with sound legal
principles .and with the humane spirit which pervades even the.
criminal law, to allow the rejected testimony to go before the jury,
the cause must be remanded for that purpose.
It was said in argument, on behalf of the State, that the alleged
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insanity was, at most but a monomania upon another topic, which
could not exempt the prisoner from responsibility for the homicide.
The judge will instruct the jury in regard to the principles of law
which govern this subject, when all the facts shall have been heard.
At present, the discussion is premature.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment
of the Court below be reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside,
and the cause remanded for a new trial according to law.

In the Supreme Court of Texas,
JOHN F. JORDAN

vs.

F. A. POLK.

1. Special administration,-Power of the County Courts to appoint.-The County
Courts of this State may grant letters of limited administration upon the estates of
deceased persons. This power existed under the Act of 1794, ch. 1, 47, and is
clearly created and defined as to the estates of non-resident decedents, by the acts
of 1842, chs. 69 and 165. But such special adtministration does not preventa
grant of the general administration in a propercase to a different person; and the
two administrations may well subsist together.
2. Same,-Rights of next of kin and credtors.-A limited administration, as contemplated by the laws of this State, is not within the letter or spirit of the law prescribing to whom the general administration shall be granted. The next of kin
or creditors cannot claim a right to special administration, if occupying an antagonistic relation to those who represent the deceased. So, where the deceased, a
non-resident,. had no estate in the limits of this State, except the subject of a suit
which he was prosecuting at the time of his death against his brother, it was no
error in the County Court to refuse the general or special administration to such
brother, and confer the special administration upon an indifferent person.

A suit was instituted in the Chancery Court at Columbia, by
James F. Jordan against John F. Jordan and others. Pending
this suit, James F. Jordan, the complainant, died in Texas, of
which State he was a citizen. His interest in this suit was the
only estate he left within this State. His counsel applied to the
County Court of Maury for letters of special administration to
carry on the suit, and recommended the defendant in error for said
ISneed's Texas Reports, vol. 1, p. 430. We are indebted to one of the learned counsel engaged in this cause for an early sheet of this report in advance of publication.Eds. A. L. Reg.
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appointment, who was neither of kin nor a creditor of the deceased.
This application was contested by John V. Jordan, one of the defendants in the bill, who claimed the general administration as next
of kin to the deceased. The County Court refus6d said application
of John F. Jordan, and appointed the defendant in error special administrator to carry on the suit. Jordan appeaId to the Circuit,
where Judge Martin affirmed the action of the County Court, whereupon Jordan appealed in error to this Court.
U. S. Fri son, for the plaintiff in error:
1. The next of kin of an intestate by law, and as a matter of
right, is entitled to the administration of the estate. 1 Meigs'
Dig. 20.
2. The next of kin cannot be deprived of this right unless there
are more claimants than one; then the Court may elect to whom
the administration shall be committed. 1 Meigs' Dig. 20; Martin
&Yerger, 43, 45.
-3.'But if the applicant is simply opposed by the other next of
kin, it would be error in the Court to refuse to commit it to the applicant. Martin & Yerger, 43, 45.
4. But this is an application for a special administration upon
the estate of a non-resident intestate to prosegute a suit, and is not "
governed by the general law. We deny that the Court can appoint
any such sqpecial adniinistratorupon theestate of a non-resident.
1. By the Act of 1841, ch. 96, § 1, the County Courts of this
State are authorized to appoint administrators generally upon the
estates of non-resident intestates, without saying to whom.
2. The Act of 1842, ch. 165, § 1, declares that letters of administration shall be granted upon application of any person interested,
his or her agent or attorney, showing that the legislature intended
to secure the right to the next of kin, as heretofore.
8. The administration should not as a matter of justice to our
own citizens, be a special one; because, if it were, such administrator could not be sued by creditors, and the assets which should be
appropriated to the payment of debts would be collected and transferred to a foreign jurisdiction, and domestic creditors sent there to
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collect their demands, when it might have been done here. 8 Humphreys, 558.
4. The only remaining objection to appointing the next of kin,
is, that he is the debtor of the estate. This is no legal :objection,
for his indebtedness would be assets of the estate, for which he and
his securities would be liable; and this is an answer to the
objection.
f. S. .Dlippen,for the defendant in error:
There may be several different administrators, general, limited,
pendente lite, and special. The word special, embraces all other
administrators save the three first named. One-may be executor
for a particular thing, Wentw. on Ex'rs, p. 12, and so it necessarily
follows, one may be administrator for a particular thing, for the
law in this respect is the same. "And where there is no general
representative an administrator or special representative limited to
the subject of the suit," may be appointed. See Williams' Ex'rs,
vol. 1, p. 329.
We assume the ground that Jordan, upon no principle, could be
administrator in this case. He could be neither general or special
administrator. Had the Court appointed him, he would have been
appointed to prosecute a suit against himself. This was the whole
object of administration; and in the language of Mr. Justice Buller, "it is impossible to say a man can sue himself." 1 Williams'
Ex'rs, 779, where is cited .offett vs. Van Millengen; 2 Bos. &
Pull. 124, note c. ; 2 Ohitty, 539 ; and Ritzgerald vs. Boehm, C.B.
Moore.
If it be insisted that the Court erred in not appointing a general
instead of a special administrator, (which is not admitted,) still some
one should have been offered other than Jordan, and the record does
not show that such was the fact. Polk was the only other person
offered; he was unexceptionable in every particular, as much as any
next of kin or other most lawful friend that might have been presented. The Court, using its discretionary power, we insist, acted
properly in refusing to-appoint Jordan general administrator, and
in appointing Polk.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
]McKINNEY, J.-This was an appeal from an order of the County Court of Maury, granting a limited administration upon the
estate of James F. Jordan, who, at the time of his death was a nonresident.
It appears from the record that James F. Jordan died 'intestate
in Texas, of which state he was a resident. Previous to and at the
time of his death, there was pending in the Chancery Court at Columbia, in this State, a suit in which he was a complainant, and
the plaintiff in error wag the principal defendant. The intestate
had no other property or assets within the State at the time of his
death, or at the time of the grant of administration, except the subject matter of said suit. For the sole purpose of prosecuting this
suit to a final termination, the counsel of the intestate applied to
the County Court of Maury, in which county the Chancery Court
in which.this suit was pending, held 'its sessions, to have a limited
administration granted upon the intestate's estate, and nominated the
defendant in error, who was not of kin to the deceased, nor a creditor
of his estate, nor interested in the suit. The plaintiff in error, who
is a brother of the intestate, appeaied and claimed, as next of'kin,
to have a general administration upon the estate of the intestate,
committed to him. But the Court refused this application, because
he was the principal defendant in said suit, against whom a decree
was sought, and had an interest in opposition to that of the representatives and distributees of. the intestate's estate, and proceeded
to grant a limited or special administration to the'defendant in error.
An appeal was presented to the Circuit Court, and the judgment
being affirmed, the case is brought here'by an appeal in error.
The first error insisted upon, is, in the grant of a limited administration. It seems to be thought that, under our law this is not admissible, and that none other than a general administration can be
granted; we do not think so. It is well settled in England, that
such limited administrations may be granted. The grant may bb
limited either to certain specific effects of the deceased, or to a certain specific purpose, as to filing a bill, or carrying on proceedings
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in Chancery. 1 Williams on Ex'rs, (ed. of 1849,) 431; 1 Hagg.
103; 2 Hagg. 62; 3 Phillimore, 815.
And it is now well settled, that if such limited administrator is
made a party to the suit, the estate of the intestate is properly represented, so as to enible the Court to proceed in the cause, and a
decree obtained against such an administrator will be binding on
any general administrator. 1 Williams on Ex'rs, 435; 3 Hare,
199, 208.
But such a limited or special administration does not prevent a
grant of the general administration, in a proper case, toa different
,person. The party entitled to the general grant might take what
is called an administration eceterorum or an administration of all
the other property or assets of the intestate. And the two administrations.may well subsist together. 1 Williams on Ex'rs,. 431,
436.
It was held in the case of MeNairy vs. Bell, 6 Yerger, 302, that
a limited administration might be grantedI by the County Court.
This was allowable under our law prior to the act of 1842, ch. 69,
and 165, which expressly authorizes a limited administration upon
the estate of a person, who, at the time of his death, was a nonresident, where the decedent left any estate, real or personal, in this
State, or where any suit in which his estate is interested, is to be
bought, prosecuted, or defended; or where any citizen of this
State, or other person, having property, chose8 in action, or debts

due them witbin this State, was indebted to such decedent at the
time of his death.
The authority of the County Court to make such limited appointment, is, therefore placed beyond all question. And in the present
case there was no pretence for a general administration, as there
was no assets within the jurisdiction of this State. Secondly, it is
urged, that admitting the regularity of a limited grant of administration, the plaintiff in error as next of kin, was entitled to be appointed; and, that therefore, in the appointment of the defendant,
there was error. This position is equally as untenable as the preceding one. In England, the Ecclesiastical Courts would not put a litigant party in possession of the property, or subject of the suit, by

RUSSELL'S HEIRS vs. RANDOLPH.

granting to him a limited administration pending the suit, but to
some one presumed to be indifferent.. I Williams on Ex'rs, 410.
Nor, under our law, can either th6Fnext of kin, or creditors, claim
a right to such appointment, if occupying an antagonistic relation
to those who represent the deceased party. A temporary administration of this sort is not within the litter or spirit of the law prescribing to whom the general administration shall be committed;
and it would seem singularly absurd to require that such special
administration should be granted to a party whose interest, and
perhaps whose first act would be to defeat the very purpse of the
grant.. Such is not the law.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Supreme Court of Texas. Galveston, 1854.
EDWARD

RUSSELL'S -HEIRS V8. HARVEY RANDOLPH.

1. A grant of land fraudulently obtained, is void ab initio, and no title passes to the
grantee, nor is the land separated from the public domain, but remains subject to
be located upon a valid certificate.
2. Domicil defined and consideted.
3. Practice in the Land Office in Texas.

Allen & Hfale, for Plaintiff in Error.
Hf. Yoalkum, for Defendant in Error.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LIPSCOMB, J.-Edward Russell, the ancestor of the plaiitiff in

error, came to Texas some time in 1834, and the 21st day of August,
1835, obtained a grant for one league of land in the present county
of Montgomery, and shortly thereafter left for the State of Maine,
avowedly for the purpose of bringing out his family to settle upon
the land cdnceded to him, and shortly after reaching his family in
the State of Maine, -where they had remained whilst he was in
Texas, he died. In 1841 or '42, Mr. Norton with his family, his
wife being a daughter of Edward Russell, cultivated and made a
crop on the land, and they have resided ever since in the State of
Texas.
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In 1849, the defendant in error, H. Randolph, as assignee 9f
Hugh Hampton, located a valid certificate issued to the said Hampton,
on the said land so granted to Russell; and on the Surveyor refusing
to survey the land for him, on the ground that the land pointed out
and designated by him was covered by Russell's grant, brought this
suit to try the right of the said heirs, alleging that it was a part of
the public domain of the State of Texas, and subject to be located
on by him in virtue of his certificate. The ground upon which the
grant is attacked, is, that it was obtained by the fraudulent representations of the grantee, in representing himself as having come
to the country with his family, when in truth he was only a transient
person, and had not brought his family with him, and that his
domicile was in the State of Maine. If the grant was soofraudulently obtained, and, without authority of law, it was void ab initio,
and never passed any title to the grantee, nor separated the land
embraced in it from the public domain, and it remained subject to
be located upon by any valid certificate. If, however, it was valid
when it was issued, it could only be re-annexed to the public
domain by forfeiture or by an abandonment of the country. (See
iolliman vs. Peebles, 1 Texas, 676, and Hancock .ys. Mc-inney,
7 Tex. 384.)
We will first inquire, whether from the facts the grantee ever
acquired a domicile before or at the date of the issuance of the grant
to him. This is a question on which there has been a great deal
said, both by foreign and our own jurists. They have, however,
agreed upon rules by which the question can be settled. The
domicile of a man's birth is presumed to continue until he has
selected another, but it is admitted that he can choose another
domicile, and that he is not tied down to that of his birth.
The evidence of such change of his domicile, or what will amount to,
such change, is not well defined. No precise time of residence at his
new selection has been prescribed as necessary to constitute it as
his domicile. If he has selected his new home with the intent of
remaining, it would seem on authority to be sufficient, if he is actually
at his new home. The intention without having gone there, or the
going there without the intention of making it his residence will
36
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not be sufficient. (See Story's Confl. L ws . J§ 44, 47.) Th9 facts-are
ehown to be that the grantee remained in the country from some time
in 1834, until August or.Septembefr, in the y.eW. following, and must
have been here seven or eight months at least,.bef'ore the title was
eztended to him. •His d6clarations and acts all c6nducell to proye
that his determwatiou was fixed and final as to his residence. - If
he had acquired a.residence here at the time of receiying jis grant,
as we believe, from the evidence he hadi and returning to his original
domiicile,,. not with the view of -remaining, but on business, such
returu would not forfeit the residenc9 he had acquired here. If,
however, when he left Texas.. for' his native domicile, it was with
-the intent to remain ther., he would forfeit his domicile here, and
with it,
the laud acquired wou!4 by.abandonment of the country,
rvertto thePubliedomaen .There is no doubt-frbm the evidence,
that it- W*a-he continued inteption 'of the. grantee to T'eturn to
Texa in as short afimeas he could prepare.to do "se, and-thai he
.would have returned vwithou -any -unneoess4ry delay, if his design
hd not-been prevented by his early death while preparing to come
-ck. -By the Constitution, of the Republic 'of Texa's section 10,
.it ioprovided, "All persons, Afric4ns, the descendants.of Africans,
and Indians excepted, who were residing in Texas on the day of the
de4a"tion.of independence, shall be considered citizens of the
Republic, and entitled to all the privileges of such--all citizens
now living in Texas who shall not have received their portion of
land in like manner, as colonists shall be entitled to their land in
the following proportion and manner. Every head of a family
shall be entitled to one league and labor of land, &c." Under this
prqvision it Was ,decided that a married man who-was in Texas it
'the date of the declaration of independence, but Iad not .brought
histfspilywith him, but had left them in Missiippi, and. afterwards went after them and brought them, was, on proof by facts
that it * as his intention to- remove to ,Texas,. entitled to one
league of land and one labor. , The Bepublic vs. Young, Daljami, 464.
In the State vs. Skidmore, 5 Texas Rep. 469,. it was held that
when the husband was-in the Republic at the declaration of inde-
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pendence, and returned soon after, and did not bring his family
until near three years after, he was entitled to a league and labor of
land upon his making proof that it was his intention to make Texas
his permanent residence, when here, and to remove his family as
soon as he conveniently could; and his wife's bad health accounted
for his long delay. In these cases, the intention of the parties
when here, without their families, of making Texas their permanent
residence, and to bring their families, whs construed to mean heads
of families at the declaration of independence under the constitution.
The principle of these cases is, that constructively their families
were with them when the husbands acquired a residence in this
country, and the principle is well explained by eminent jurisconsults,
both American and foreign,.that the domicile of the husband is the
domicil 'of his wife and children. See Story, Conflict of Laws,
§ 44. The principle upon which the cases of Skidmore and Young
were deciqed, are believed to be decisive of this case. If .Russell,
the grantee, had acquired a residence in Texas, animo manendi;
constructively, his wife and children were here, too;. because his
residence by operation of law would also be their residence. And
if he only left his new residence, and returned to his old, for a
temporary purpose, either on business~or on a visit, it did not annul
the new residence; nor-could it by his death so happening during
his temporary absence, divest his heirs of the title to the land he
had acquired as a colonist. The 31st article of the Colonization
Law of the 28th April, 1832, is as follows: "Every new settler
from the time of his settlement shall be permitted to dispose of his
land, although it shall not be cultivated, by testament made in
conformity to the laws that. are now or shall hereafter be in force,
and should he die intestate, his lawful heir or heirs shall succeed
him in the enjoyment of-his rights of property, assuming in both
cases the obligations and conditions incumbent on the respective
grantees." The same provision is found in the Colonization Law
of 1825, by the same provision, and the Colonization Law bf 1825
was not repealed as to Empresario Coritracts entered into under it,
but such contracts were expressly reserved in the Act of 1832. The
conditions to be performed were all subsequent, and before any of
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them could be required, to ,*t: in. six or seven months froA the
date of the concession, a revolution interveied, ,aad the Republic of
Texas -was 'established, and all these conditionierq
abolished, so
far as single head right leagues were concerned, by the Act of
Congress of 14th December,18S7. This was only the re-enactment
o-tho Act of 1836, December 22, on the payment of the land dues.
The record shows that these dues were paid. Hart, Digest, Article
"1860. .An& although the heir maylose his right by a long continued
absence and foreign domicile, a reasonable time ought to be allowed
him tb become a citizen- or sell his lands. What this reasonible
time should be, may be settled by analogy to-the nine years given
in'subsequest legislation to. absent heir to become citizensor to
sell the property of their ancestor. The Act of Congress of

.Janiary, 1840.

Hart, Dig. Art. 585, is as follows: "In. making

t*le -to land by descent, it shall be ,no bar"to a, party'that any
ancestor through whiom he derives his descent trom the kntestate is
or hath been an alien. And every alien-'to whom land may be
devised or may descend, shall have nine years to become a citizen
of the Republf and take possession of such land, or shall have nine
years to sell the same, before it can be declared forfeited, or before
it shall be escheated to the Government." It was in evidence that
Mrs. Norton, a daughter of Edward Russell, the grantee, with her
family, made a crop upon the land in 1842, and have resided in
Texas ever since.
•The strongest evidence of fraud in procuring the title on the 'part
of Russell, is his representation to the Commissioner in his applica'tion for the laid. He states that he has come to Texas with his
faily, a wife and three children, wheii it is in evidence that his'
*ife and children were not at that time in Texas; and if it was an
indispensable, requisite of the law, that they' should have been
actually with him, as a condition upon which title could be extended,
it.*ould seem, that it would mtke the grant void both on account
of the fraud and for want of legal sanction. -It seems, however,
that if he had such family as he describes, that by -the usages of the
country, and the practice of the Commissioner in extending titles,
the family were in law constructively with him. This is presumed
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from the fact that the officers did so receive him, and as -it
was the
duty of the Empresario and Commissioner to inquire into the
qualifications of those offering themselves as colonists, the presumption, though not conclusive, is that they did not transcend their
authority or violate their instructions.
Mr. Hotchkiss, a witness, swears that the grantee lived with him
some time at his house at Nacogdoches; swears that the officers
who extended titles to him, knew at the time that the wife and
children were not actually with him, and that it was usual to issue
titles under such circumstances, and that it had been sanctioned
by the'Attorney General and Assessor General. Mr. Rankin, whose
affidavit is in the record, swears the practice to have beez the isame
as proven by Mr. Hotchkiss; and that he: had been surveyor in
both Austin's and Yehlin's colonies, and that it was usual in both
colonies. We have no doubt that in hundreds of cases it was done;
the head of the family often preceding his wife and children, and
making arrangements here, by selecting and procuring the land,
and sometimes making a crop, or building cabins before the rest of
the family would be brought out. The evidence of Mr. Hotchkiss
was not objected to, and therefore cannot be objected to 'inthis
Court, as- the instructions of the Assessor General would go to
establish not only the practice, but would also tend to prove that
it was authorized by the proper authorities; and the case of .Holli-

man vs. -Peebles, 1 Tex. 676, further confirms the fact of such
being the practice of the country, at least. Were we to decide that
this practice was a fraud and unauthorized by law, and the title so
issued void, we might disturb hundreds of the grants obtained by
the early settlers, and deprive them of their lands, for which they
had encountered all the peril, toil, and privation to which the early
settler was exposed. We believe, however, that if in this case
Russell only went back to bring his wife and children, and would
have brought them, had it not been for his early death, that his
heirs are entitled to the land be had obtained.
The Court was requested, on the trial of this case by the attorney
for the unknown heirs, to charge the jury :-" That if they believed
from the evidence that Russell, the ancestor of the defendants,
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alplied for and obtained the grant in good faith, and in good faith
went for his fathily, aud. diea in his effoit to bring them to Texas,
in pursuance of'tie grant, they will find fof the defendants ;" which
charge the-Court refused to give. In view of the evidenc6 and the
law on which we have commented, we believe the Court erred- in
refusihg'to give the charge prayed for.
The Court'erred also in ovrruling tihe moti6n for a new trial,
on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence.
Theie is nothing in the grounds state& by the counsel for the
appellee, in his motion to dismiss the vrit of error in this case.
We have no doubt but the attorney tppoihted -by the Court to
represeit the heirs, had a right to bring thi case up-for revision.
For the above 6rrors 'the judgment niust be reversed,*and the
cause -remanded for a' new trial, in 'arcordahc6 'rith the opinion
gien by us.,

RECENT ENGLISH DECISION.

Yce-Chancelor
i
Wood8 Court.
SCOTT vs. BENTLEY.
1. Where a creditor had been found, lunatic inScotlandl-and a curator bonorum
appointed there--Held, that such curator bonorum has.alone a right to sue and
give discharges for personal estate of the lunatic, in ngand.
2. The debtor, not disputing his liability, nor the amount due, but only the right to
give a disoharge, paid the amount into a bank:-Held, that this was equivalent

to a declaration of trust, and that the curator bonorum.was right in proceeding
in equity.

The qntion in this case Was to the right of a curator bonorum of a lunatic in Scotland to receive personal estate in England,
onsisting of arrears of an annity of 13001., secured on lands in
England, with a covenant to pay the annuity, and a power to the.
IWe are indebted to one of the learned counsel concerned in ihis case, and are
assured that the judgment is of much interest and importance" in Texas.-[Eds.
A. L. Bey.]
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grantee to distrain, and further secured by a bond in a penal sum
of 13001. The defendant, the personal representative and sole
trustee of the will of the grantor, had paid the money into a bank,
but insisted on having the most effectual guarantee, viz. that of the
Court. The curator thereupon filed this bill to have the arrears
handed.over to him, and to have the future payments made to him
so long as he should continue curator bonorum; and the annuity
was dated in 1837, and was duly paid up to April, 1851. The
plaintiff was fully appointed curator bonorum, and the opinion of
Scotch lawyers was in evidence that nothing could be done there to
complete the plaintiff's title, and that in Scotland he would be
entitled to receive the money. The .annuity constituted the whole
of the property of the.lunatic, pnd the pum lying in the bank was
only gafing 21. per cent. interest.
Bolt and

. .D.Evans, for the plaintiff.

In a somewhat similar case before Lord Cottenham, when he was
asked to order payment of a fund to the curator, he suggested
whether payment of the dividends would not be sufficient, which'
was ordered accordingly. The person appointed, in the country
where the lunatic is domiciled, to the care of his estate, must, from
the necessity of the case, be able to give a receipt for every part of
it connected with personal estate. The argument might be carried
also to real. estate, but the facts do not require that. As far as the
law of Scotland, in a converse case, is of any authority, it is clear
in favor of the plaintiff's claim. (Gordon vs. Lord Stair, 13 Shaw
& Dunl.) [Sir W. P. 'Wood, V. C,-You may put it in this way
-that when a curator is appointed, the law executes a power of
attorney by the lunatic to him.] Newton vs. Manning, (1 Mac. &
G. 362); 1n re Morgan, (there cited); and In re Elia, (3 Mac.
& G. 234), are, so far as they go, authorities in favor of the plaintiff's right. The last case is, as reported, only intituled fin lunacy;
but the petition must also have been presented in the matter of the
Act 3 & 4 Will. 4.
Daniel and G. L. Russell, for the defendant.
Bolt, in reply.
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Feb. 20.-Sir-W.-P. Wood, V. O.-The question is, whether" the
curator bonorum is entitled to sue for personal estate of the lunatic
in England. It is singular that there should be in such a case so
small an amount of authority. There is, however, one-a case in
the House of Lords. And dicta have been not unfrequent which
favor the same construction. The case I allude to, In re Morison,
is nowhere distinctly reported
The committee appointed under
proceedings in England in lunacy of the estate of a Mr. Morison,
resident in England, sued for personal estate in Scotland. The
Court of Session decided against the right of the committee ; but it
appears that the House of Lords reversed the decision. Lord
Hardwicke, in Thorne vs. Watkins, (2 Yes. sen. 35, 37), commenting upon the doctrine that personalty has no locality, that all
debts follow the person of the creditor and not of the debtor, says,
"Therefore debts due to a freeman of London anywhere are distributable according to the custom ; and of that opinion I was in
.Piponvs. Pion, (Amb. 25). This also came in question in the
House of Lords lately, on the lunacy of Mr. Morison; the question
was, whether the rule would be the same in the courts of Scotland;
and the opinion was, that it would be the same; and that it would
be the same in a question between a court of France and -a court of
England." Mr. Morison's case is more fully stated, arguendo, by
Hill, Serjt., in Sill vs. Worswie, (1 H. B1. 665, 677, 682), which
was a case in bankruptcy; there the doctrine is maintained just in
the same way. The marginal note is, that assignees in an English
bankruptcy may recover from one of the creditors a debt which
such creditor had attached and obtained possession of in the Island
of St. Christopher. Therefore, putting Thorne vs. Watkins altogether on one side, there would be authority to that extent, that a
committee appointed in England is entitled to sue in Scotland for
debts and assets there; which would go far to show that a curator
bonorum appointed in Scotland should have an equal right to sue
for and collect debts and assets in England. In iSelkrig vs. Davies
(2 Rose, 98) the judgment of Lord Eldon goes the whole extent of
saying, that whatever might be the case as to realty, the English
commission clearly passed the personal property in Scotland, and
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all other parts of the world. That, again, was in a case of bankruptcy. In Newton vs. Manning, (1 Mac. & G. 864), Lord Cottenham seems to be of the same opinion; the petitioner there being
appointed in France guardian of a defendafit who had become lunatic,
his Lordship appears to have said, that if the law of France warranted the proposed dealing with the lunatic's property, the money
would be paid. The only analogy opposed to the curator's right in
the present case is that from the case of executors; a Scottish
personal representative could not, as such, sue here; and it was
said that guardians of infants could not. Beattie vs. Johnstone
(1 Ph. 17,) was cited for the latter position; but -in that case Lord
Lyndhurst does not say that they have no rights, but he only
expresses some doubts as to what their rights are. The -ase of
administration is quite distinct, because that depends upon the
authority of the Ecclesiastical Court, and therefore has no analogy
with the present case. The analogy is much more near with the
case of assignees in bankruptcy, who when appointed here, the act
of Parliament vesting all the estate of the bankrupt in them, they
are allowed to sue in Scotch courts. I think, therefore, that the
curator is entitled to recover this money; and the only question is,
whether he is entitled to recover in this suit. As to the form of
suit being by the curator alone, it is allowed that he can sue alone
in Scotland; 'and, as in Atori8on's case, it appears that'a committee
appointed here can sue there just as if appointed there. And as to
the proper course being at law, it appears that the money here
being deposited at the banker's, amounts to an admission or declaration of trust in favor of somebody-only the person who has the
right to give a discharge is in question. The curator, therefore, is
right in coming here, and it must be paid to him on his sole receipt.
As to costs, it is a new point, without any distinct authority; therefore let the defendant have costs out of the fund, and trustee's costs,
for it is a suit to administer the fund.

MARCHI v SAMSOI ET AL.

RECENT FRENCH DECISIONS.

Tribunal Correctionalde la Seine, (6 MA.) 1854.
MARC]I VS. SAMSON ET AL.
1. The copying of a statuette by means of the daguerreotype or other photographic
apparatus, and the use of the stereoscope to give relief to the copies thus made,
to the injury of the owner of the original work of art, is an infringement-of his
copyright.

The following is in substance, the judgment of the Court in this
case
An idea, and its embodiment through the means of any art
whatever, are the property of its author.
The reproduction of a work of art, in whatever manner, and
whatever process and material its author may have employed, consttutes'an unquestionable breach of copyright, when made without
the asent of the original author of the artistic work, or his assigns.
Such a reproduction is of a nature to injure.the rights and interests
of the author, by vulgarizing his work, and conspnnantly diminishing its artistic and commercial value.
In the present case, Marchi has established his property in thi
entire productions of the late Prafdier, and on this title he has the
right and interest to prosecute. for the suppression of in infringement which operates to his injury. It has been proved on the trial,
that Samson, Deschamps and Bertrand have infringed his copyright,
by taking impres.sions on daguerreotype plates, or on paper, from
the statuettes of Rradier, of which Marchi is proprietor, and by
giving relief thereto, with the stereoscope ; and that Gandin,
Dubosc and Montfort, have retailed these imitations. They have
thus besides the commissioil of the unlawful act itself, caused an
injury to Marchi, which the Court has before it sufficient materials
to estimate.
The Court, therefore, applying to Samson, Bertrand, Gandin,
Dubose and Montfort, articles 425, 26, 27, of the Penal Code,
imposes on Bertrand, Samson and Deschanlps, a fine of 1IO francs
each; on Gandin, a fine of 200 francs, and on Dubosc and Montfort,
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one of 100 francs each, fixes the amount of pecuniary separation
due to Marchi, at 4,000 francs, and condemns the defendants jointly
and severally, to pay that sum ; directs an imprisonment of two
years; orders the insertion of this judgment intwo newspapers, at
the option of Marchi, and decrees the confiscation of the articles
seized.

Cour Imypriale de Paris. (1 Ch.) 20 Dec., 1853.
MALGAIGNE Vs. DE SAINT PRIEST.
1. The editor of a collective work, has the right, even in the absence of any special
agreement, to make such changes and suppressions in the articles of contributors,
as he may judge proper, so long as those changes and suppressions do not affect
the plan and idea of the original
2. The task of correcting for the press, the proofs of articles in such a work, belongs
to the editor.

This was an appeal from a decision of the Trianalde Commerce
de Za Seine, reported 1 Am. Law Register, 42, where the facts are
stated. That decision is reversed by i decree, the substance of
which is as follows:
'In undertaking the preparation of the article, "1Medeeine," for
the ._Encyclop'diedu XX Sicle, Malgaigne, even in the absence
of any special agreement to that effect, submitted himself implicitly
to the control of the editor. In making certain changes, in this
article, De Saint Priest was only exercising a right, though it might
perhaps have been more courteous in him to have entrusted the
author himself with this task. The plan and idea of the original
article have, however, been scrupulously preserved. The duty of
the editor of the _ncJyciopdie has been properly performed, and
the changes introduced by him in the article, in order to adapt it to
the general tone of the work, have not in anywise altered its
character.
On the other hand, the corrections for the press ought properly to
be made by the principal editor in the case of a work collectively prepared by a number of persons; and this is a custom generally followed.

